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Around the world, the devastation of climate-related impacts has threatened 
livelihoods, ecosystems and the stability of sociopolitical institutions. Droughts have 
often caused serious agricultural losses and human suffering and the images of famine in 
Africa and human displacement in Northeast Brazil illustrate just a few of the hardships 
that are part of a much larger problem. In recent years, the possibility of more frequent 
and extreme events as a result of longterm climate change has fueled new avenues of 
inquiry to understand the vulnerability of different human and social systems to these 
events. And the growing recognition that some degree of adaptation to climate change 
will be unavoidable has increasingly moved the burden of action from the scientific realm 
to nation states, multilateral and bilateral development organizations, citizen’s groups and 
communities that will be expected to respond to negative impacts of climate variability 
and change (Eakin and Lemos 2006). 
One critical element of this inquiry is the need to understand the process through 
which institutions at different scales are affected and respond to climate variability as a 
means to assess how prepared they might be to respond to and recover from future 
climate change. The IPCC defines adaptive capacity as “the ability of a system to adjust 
to climate change (including climate variability and extremes), to moderate potential 
damages, to take advantage of opportunities, or to cope with the consequences’’ (IPCC 
2001). Adaptation, in turn, refers to the actual actions and responses of a system to 
exposure—defined as the amount of (potential) damage caused to a system by a 
particular climate-related event or hazard. Successful adaptation should result in an equal 
or improved situation (when compared with the initial condition); unsuccessful ones, or 
maladaptation occur when the outcome situation is worse than before. 
Adaptation is essentially related to a system’s level of resilience, defined as “the 
capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganize while undergoing change so as 
to still retain essentially the same function, structure, identity, and feedbacks (Folke, et al. 
2005). In this view, resilience refers not only to the amount of change or variability a 
system can absorb before shifting states but also its capacity for self-organization and its 
ability to learn and innovate in face of uncertainty and change. Although it is possible to 
design specific adaptations to anticipated impacts, a greater challenge is to define what 
attributes are necessary to make these adaptations successful. Given the large uncertainty 
in scenarios of future change, it makes more sense to focus on capacities rather than 
specific adaptations. While there has been considerable effort in the literature to theorize 
what attributes may enhance the capacity of human and sociopolitical systems to respond 
and recover from negative impacts of climate related phenomena (Smit, et al. 2000; Folke 
and S. R. Carpenter 2002; Yohe and Tol 2002; Tompkins and Adger 2005; Eakin and 
Lemos 2006), there has been relatively few empirical studies that seek to understand how 
this capacity can or has been built (or not) in the real world.  What factors make human, 
social and political systems less vulnerable to climate-related phenomena? In this article, 
I argue that building resilience is a two-tiered process that must include both risk 
management to climate impact and deeper level socioeconomic and political reform that 
addresses the root causes of vulnerability, especially among the vulnerable poor. In this 
process, tier one comprises the design and implementation of risk management 
institutions and organizations—such as disaster preparedness plans, warning systems and 
emergency disaster relief—that can potentially mitigate the most immediate and 
egregious effects of climate-related impact. Although the efficacy of risk management   3
systems varies widely—even among countries at similar levels of vulnerability and 
development—some form of risk management can currently be found in most countries 
of the world. Tier two encompasses socioeconomic and political reform that addresses 
the range of inequalities at the root of differential vulnerabilities. Reforms such as income 
redistribution, land reform, educational programs and political reform are just a few that 
might be necessary to decrease vulnerability among the poor in less developed countries, 
for example. Although these kinds of reform have been in the development agenda for a 
long time, they have proved elusive to most poor countries in the world. Yet, the threat of 
climate change as an emergent stressor that will exacerbate vulnerability, especially in 
less developed areas of the world, only make their implementation more urgent. Beyond 
the state—but certainly not without it—this two-tiered process must involve a broad 
number of institutions across the state-private-community divide as well as across 
different scales of decisionmaking (Lemos and Agrawal 2006). On the one hand, the kind 
of deep transformation needed to address inequalities at the root of vulnerability has 
historically been economically, socially and politically too costly for most governance 
systems to tackle and the daunting character of its implementation maybe intimidating at 
best and paralyzing at worst. On the other hand, aiming at deeper transformation does not 
have to be an all or nothing proposition and one way to spearhead change is to identify 
which among risk management actions currently in place can be more or less conducive 
to create the conditions for structural reform. For example, by subscribing to risk 
management approaches that create positive synergies across the state-society divide, 
drought response planning or water management institutions may create the conditions to 
build longer term resilience among vulnerable groups. Approaches that are inclusionary 
(participatory), accountable, transparent and democratic, maybe more conducive to the 
creation of an empowered citizenry more equipped to break free from clientelist systems 
and to mobilize for social reform. Similarly, approaches that integrate risk management 
with sustainable natural resources use and adaptive governance may be more conducive 
to social learning and to building resilience and social capital than topdown approaches 
that insulate decisionmaking from stakeholders. 
This case study focuses on Northeast Brazil, a region historically plagued by 
drought (and occasionally by flooding in urban settings), which is presently the object of 
concerted efforts to assess the vulnerability of human and natural ecosystems to climate 
variability (Lemos, et al. 2002; Lemos and Oliveira 2004; Nelson 2005; Lemos 
forthcoming).  In this region, water scarcity and vulnerability to drought have been given 
high priority on policy and decisionmaking agendas. This analysis particularly examines 
the state of CEará, one of the poorest in NE Brazil. For the past twenty years, Ceará has 
been the object of numerous studies focusing both on its vulnerability to drought as well 
as on the reform of its governance and political approach to respond to it (Pessoa 1987; 
Magalhães and Neto 1991; Magalhães, et al. 1991; Carvalho, et al. 1993; Tendler 1997; 
Lemos, et al. 2002; Lemos 2003; Nelson 2005). The next sections will briefly describe 
Ceará and its historical response to drought; explore some of the ways socio-political 
change shaped drought planning reform and speculate how such reform contributed (or 
not) to the building of adaptive capacity in three specific policy sectors: agriculture, water 
management and disasters response. 
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NE Brazil and Ceará: Brazil’s Northeast encompasses eighteen percent of the national 
territory and one third of the country’s population.  It is divided into nine states that 
constitute the vast majority of the infamous “polygon of drought”, a particularly 
vulnerable region, which has recorded five centuries of periodic crisis. In 2000, Ceará’s 
GDP per capita corresponded to only 50% Brazil’s GDP per capita (IPLANCE 2000).  
Despite high levels of poverty, for the past ten years, Ceará has been undergoing a 
remarkable political and socio-economic change that has critically affected its social 
indicators and policymaking process.   
 
Table 1 displays some of these improved numbers. 
 
Table 1: Selected social indicators 
 
Indicators 
  1987  1997  2005 
Infant Mortality  137.0 
(1)  40.0 33.2
(Folke and T. Hahn) 
Population with monthly income below minimum wage (%)   33.5 
(2) 19.9   
Illiteracy (% of the population over 7 years-old)  43.3 31.7  22.6
(Folke and T. Hahn) 
Level of education (% of population between 7-14 years old
(6)  56.7 95.0  96.8 
Households with piped water (%)  31.5 53.3  74.0 
Houses with electricity (%)  53.1 
(Folke and T. Hahn) 75.6  95.6 
Households with garbage collection (%)  28.0 49.0  72.2 
 
Source: IBGE/PNAD, SEDUC, SESA, Government of the State of Ceará, 2000 
Notes:   (1) 1986 
  (2) the rate for 1997 is 42/1,000 
  (Folke and T. Hahn) 1985 
  (Folke and T. Hahn) 2004 
(Folke and T. Hahn) % population over 15 years old 
(6) Number of people enrolled in schools 
 
While, this positive change can be partly explained by broader processes of 
democratization in Brazil and concerted efforts from progressive politicians in Ceará—
especially at the higher echelons—to improve public policymaking implementation, the 
effects of macroeconomic growth on the poor have been less straightforward and high 
levels of inequality and income concentration persist. For example, the state’s Gini 
coefficient has actually increased from 0.65 in 1991 to 0.68 in 2001 (Nelson 2005). Yet, 
recent research on policymaking in Brazil has identified Ceará as a case where 
policymakers have achieved a significant level of success while carrying out public 
policies (Tendler 1997; Lemos 2003; Lemos and Oliveira 2004; Lemos and Oliveira 
2005). 
 
Impacts of Global Climate Change: Societies in semi-arid regions in developing 
countries are typically highly vulnerable to variability of climate and water availability 
due to low consistency of water availability under average climate conditions. Northeast 
Brazil is typical of these regions in that it is already regularly affected by severe droughts 
that have led to major famines in the past. As a result of this natural climate variability, 
local populations’ economic and social well-being has been negatively impacted  (Gaiser, 
Ferreira and Stahr 2003). More frequent droughts will only make this situation worse. As   5
mean global temperatures rise, semi-arid regions are expected to experience more 
frequent prolonged droughts and decreased water availability. 
Recently released climate projections for Northeast Brazil are indicating a strong 
likelihood of increased temperatures and decreased precipitation, resulting in a growing 
aridizabtion of the region (Ambrizzi, et al. 2007). If predictions that under climate change 
there will be more El Niño-like mean conditions are right, Northeast Brazil will become 
drier since dry years are highly linked to the ENSO phenomenon. Extreme droughts 
occurred in Northeast Brazil during the strong ENSO years of 1911-1912, 1925-1926, 
1982-1983, and 1997-1998 (IPCC TAR). In addition, a recent modeling study (Krol and 
Bronstert 2007) indicates strong links between changes in precipitation and availability of 
water resources. Under their dry scenario, river runoff decreases by twice the level of 
precipitation change. Coupled with increased demand, the model predicts increasing 
water shortages over the next 50 years. 
Under climate change, drier conditions will have a major impact on agriculture. In 
Ceará, these impacts can potentially be devastating since an estimated 96% of the 
agriculture in the state (around 1, 700 000 ha) is rainfed (SDA 2007).  And although the 
economic contribution of agriculture to the overall economy is low (6.6 percent of state 
GDP), around 40% of the economically active population still depends on it for their 
livelihoods (SEPLAN, 2000).
1  Moreover, soil moisture levels are expected to decrease, 
reducing the suitability to cereal production in the region (Fischer, Shah and Velthuizen 
2002). In fact, Northeast Brazil is predicted to suffer among the worst yield impacts in 
the world (Rosenzweig, et al. 1993; Rosenzweig and Hillel 1998).  Since the region is 
home to 45 million people and is already prone to droughts and famine, changes in the 
climate that exacerbate food shortages are expected to have major human consequences 
(IPCC 2001).  In this context, understanding the underpinnings of adaptive capacity 
building in the region is paramount. 
 
Historical Response to Drought. In Northeast Brazil, reports about devastating drought 
episodes trace back to the first Jesuit missionaries who arrived in the region in the late 
1500s. From 1877-79, a well-documented period of global drought resulted in a 
widespread famine that forced 3 million people to migrate and killed an estimated 
500,000 (four percent of the Brazilian population at the time) (Villa 2000 p. 83; Davis 
2001).  More recently, the El Niño-related 1979-83 drought affected eighteen million 
people and cost approximately US$1.8 billion in emergency programs (Magalhães, et al. 
1988 p. 293).
2  And while the region’s low levels of average rainfall is surely a factor in 
these disasters, vulnerability to drought among the poor is critically defined by an 
extreme unequal distribution of power and resources within the region. 
For over a century, local and federal governments have attempted to alleviate the 
negative effects of drought in the region mostly by managing risk rather than addressing 
deeper causes of vulnerability to drought.
3 Because early on public officials equated 
drought to water scarcity, most of the emphasis to respond was concentrated around two 
actions. First, officials sought to increase the region’s capacity to storage water. 
Consequently, both state and federal governments spent significant resources in the 
construction of waterworks, especially reservoirs and dams. Additionally, the state 
initiated investment in climate-related data collection and science (Lemos 2003).
4 
Second, the state and federal governments invested substantially in post-disaster   6
emergence relief by funding food and water distribution programs as well as state-
financed work fronts for drought victims.  These two approaches to adaptation not only 
failed to decrease longterm vulnerability to drought significantly among the poorest 
segments of Ceará’s population but also contributed to a vicious cycle of clientelistic 
politics that has plagued the history of drought response in the state. The “drought 
industry”, that is, the corrupt misappropriation and misuse of public funds earmarked for 
drought-relief for private gain (Lemos and Oliveira 2004), both feed and is fed by the 
ability of conservative policy networks to keep the status quo of poverty and inequality. 
Because the drought industry involves the accumulation of both political and financial 
capital, local politicians and those illicitly benefiting from it may have little incentive to 
address drought effectively and proactively.
5  One of the main strategies of emergency 
drought relief since the beginning of the century has been the creation of public work 
fronts (frentes de trabalho), which continue to be a national symbol of suffering (Lemos, 
et al. 2001). In the past, local officials informed the state government of critical levels of 
deprivation, which then was relayed through political channels to the federal government. 
Once an emergency status was officially “declared”, resources were then released at the 
federal level to move back down the structure to the state, to the município, to those 
affected by drought. Placement in such programs was often obtained through a clientelist 
relationship with local political bosses. Figure 1 illustrates the vicious cycle of drought, 
vulnerability, and clientelism in Ceará and NE Brazil. 
 
.  
 
However, as the definition of drought expanded from water scarcity (the climate-
related hazard) to include its interaction with poverty and other determinants of 
vulnerability such as reliance on rain-fed agriculture, lack of credit, illiteracy, lack of 
knowledge and technology, etc, drought policy also changed. By 1987, state response to 
drought, at least on paper, had undergone a dramatic reform.
6  Rather than emergency 
Politicians, 
dependent on 
clientelism to 
survive politically, 
have little incentive 
to build resilience 
and poor dwellers 
remain vulnerable.
Because these 
programs address 
only the symptoms 
and not the causes 
of vulnerability, 
they fail to build 
long term 
resilience
Drought affects 
vulnerable rural 
dwellers who then 
depend on state 
sponsored social 
programs to 
survive 
Politicians 
exchange 
placement in these 
programs (eg. food 
baskets, water 
trucks and work 
fronts) for votes   7
actions, the state government decided to focus on long-term projects associated with 
communities.  New programs emphasized rural development and alleviation of poverty 
through agrarian reform, creation of irrigated zones, development of hydrographic 
microbasins, rational water management, development of micro and small businesses in 
the interior, education, basic rural health and sanitation, agro-industry, rural extension, 
creation of food security programs, community development, etc. (Magalhães, et al. 
1991).  These programs also encouraged more community involvement in the decision-
making process.  However, many of these initiatives never left the planning stage while 
others either only partially achieved their goals or failed altogether. The modernization 
push improved many aspects of policy making in Ceará (Tendler 1997) but still was not 
enough to reduce the consequences of drought significantly, primarily because a 
substantial portion of the rural population were not benefited by these programs (Frota 
1985). Although they intended to strengthen the resistance of the rural population to 
drought by stabilizing production for the small farmer, here again implementation mostly 
concentrated on the increase of water supply instead of longer-term re-distributive 
policies. Consequently, large segments of Ceará's poor remain significantly vulnerable to 
climate variability (Lemos, et al. 2002). 
While integrated and proactive drought policy and structural reform to decrease 
poverty and vulnerability keep eluding Ceará’s policymakers, the state risk management 
system has come a long way. On the one hand, the state’s drought relief mechanisms 
have undergone an extensive reform, which eliminated many of the negative aspects of 
earlier predecessors. In the late 1980s, the state created a new integrated drought relief 
management (which since then has had several incarnations) that attempts to address 
corruption, clientelism, and inefficiency through the inclusion of stakeholders in 
decisionmaking, the implementation of institutional arrangements that hold both 
organizations and public actors more accountable, and the systematic use of knowledge 
to support response to drought. While the reform system is far from perfect (see next 
sections), it is a great improvement over past initiatives and has had the ironic effect that, 
as a result of  the influx of emergency resources, many farmers actually have more 
resources in a drought year than in other years (Nelson and Finan 2007). In addition, the 
state is still experimenting with different approaches to respond to drought, including a 
few new initiatives that learn from past successes and attempt deepen both participatory 
processes and new methodologies to assess vulnerability. One of these initiates—Projeto 
Maplan (Participatory Mapping for Planning)—is presently being undertaken by the State 
Secretary of Regional and Local Planning, in conjunction with FUNCEME. It addresses 
issues of drought within a larger framework of vulnerability reduction through building 
adaptive capacity and bridging the civil society-political divide. However, it is too early 
to assess its outcomes.
7 Other projects trying to address longterm vulnerability to drought 
include small farming crop insurance for those who lose 50% or over of their crops 
because of drought
8 and projects to enhance access of small farmers to rural extension 
services and more lucrative cultures targeting export markets.
9  Next, we examine three 
specific policy areas—water management, disaster-relief and agriculture—and compare 
their outcome both in terms of risk reduction and general adaptive capacity building. 
 
Agriculture
10. The Hora de Plantar Program, a program started in 1988, aimed at 
distributing high-quality, selected seed to poor subsistence farmers in Ceará and  at   8
maintaining a strict planting calendar to decrease rainfed farmers sensitivity to climate 
variability.  In exchange for the selected seeds, farmers “paid” back the government with 
grain harvested during the previous season (the same amount of the seeds they receive) or 
received credit to be paid the following year.  The rationale for the program was to 
provide farmers with high quality seeds (corn, beans, rice, and cotton), but to distribute 
them only when planting conditions were appropriate. Because farmers tend to plant with 
the first rains (sometimes called the “pre-season”) and often have to replant, the goal of 
this program was to use scientific information to orient farmers with regard to the true 
onset of the rainy season  (Lemos, et al. 2001).    
  To inform the program, the agriculture state agency used a computer-based soil 
humidity model developed by the state meteorology agency (FUNCEME) (Andrade 
1995).
11  This model, used to calculate soil humidity, incorporates seven main physical 
parameters: soil humidity, daily precipitation, evaporation, maximum water retention 
capacity of the soil, water infiltration capacity, run-off, and water percolation. During the 
rainy season  FUNCEME técnicos entered daily rainfall data into the model and 
calculated the level of soil humidity and its ability to retain enough moisture for plant 
growth (Andrade 1995).  From the model, FUNCEME established the number of days 
that would take for the soil to lose the moisture gained from the last rainfall.  FUNCEME 
then mapped out the municipios whose soils could withstand at least eleven days without 
rain and sent this information to the state agency in charge of distributing the seed to 
these municipios (Andrade 1995).
12   
There are many drawbacks to this plan. First, the quality of the data (both rainfall 
and soil data) is low for the level of precision designed into the model. Second, the 
program was plagued by a series of logistical and enforcement problems (transportation 
and storage of seed, lack of enough distribution centers, poor access to information and 
seeds by those most in need, fraud, outdate client lists, etc). Third, the program 
systematically ignored local and lay knowledge accumulated for year to inform its 
design. In stead it relied on a model of knowledge use that privileged the use of technical 
information imposed on the farmers in a exclusionary and insulated form that alienated 
stakeholders and hampered buying in from clients (Lemos 2003).  Finally, farmers 
strongly resented Hora de Plantar's planting calendar and its imposition over their own 
best judgment.  According to one farmer "even if I plant and loose, at least I have a 
chance.  When I don't plant, I know for sure I won't have what to eat."  Thus, at great 
sacrifice, most farmers store their own seed from one season to the next so as not to 
depend on Hora de Plantar.
13  Despite the shortcomings of the Hora de Plantar seed 
distribution program, a few small farmers did recognize the advantage of genetically 
improved seeds and praised the program as a help to those who have no seed or cannot 
afford to buy it on the market.  The program is still active, although by 2002, the strict 
coupling of seed distribution and the planting calendar had been phased out (Lemos 
2003). Table 2 shows the level of participation in Hora de Plantar.   
 
Table 2: Participation in the Hora de Plantar program 
 
Município 
Previous 
Participation 
% HH 
Participation 
in 1997       
% HH   9
Limoeiro do Norte  56 37 
Barbalha  67 47 
Parambu  43 21 
Boa Viagem  64 54 
Itarema  53 43 
Guaraciaba do Norte  44 42 
Total  54 41 
 
Source: (Lemos, et al. 2001) 
 
Drought relief. After many years of clientelistic policymaking, in the mid-1980s, the 
structure of drought relief in Ceará underwent a profound reform. For the first time, 
Ceará’s government created a centralized structure for drought response that coordinated 
the efforts from all areas of the state government under the state department for Social 
Action (Secretaria de Ação Social) (Carvalho 1993). 
From the early 1990s on, adhering to a new philosophy of drought policy, the 
Productive Work Fronts Program (Programa Frentes Produtivas de Trabalho— PFPT) 
embodied two major changes over past efforts.  First, it sought to identify and pursue 
permanent public works directed to community use.  Second, the PFPT encouraged the 
creation of local municipal councils responsible for selecting emergency program 
beneficiaries and the specific local public works projects to be executed (Carvalho et al. 
1993: 114).  Another critical change in the approach to disaster relief was the design of 
new criteria for the kind of works and workers that would qualify for funding (Tendler 
1997).  The new Community Action Groups became the focal point for decisionmaking 
regarding emergency relief.  In contrast to previous programs where local politicians used 
relief funds and jobs as political currency, the GACs (under the supervision of local 
extension agents) included representatives of several sectors of society such as the 
Church, rural labor unions, city council representatives, landowners associations, state 
officials, and professional associations (Tendler 1997).   
In the new system, at the onset of a drought, the state Civil Defense employs a 
local level monitoring system based on the quantity and temporal distribution of rainfall, 
vegetation indexes, yield losses, and social tension episodes to establish a triage ranking 
for government response (Governo do Estado do Ceará 1997).  As suggested earlier, the 
new system, which started in the late 1980s but was constantly changed throughout the 
1990s, improved the old clientelistic model in several ways.  It democratized local 
instances of decision by installing município-based committees that are responsible for 
identifying the neediest families in each drought-affected community.  By the early 
1990s, the committees' coordination was transferred from the state extension agency to 
Civil Defense técnicos who supervised their workings and closely monitored emergency 
fronts' implementation.  Community representatives in the committees–now called 
COMDECs (Comite de Defesa Civil)–generate a list ranking the families of each 
community according to need.  These lists are then prioritized within the município and 
used as a basis for the distribution of jobs, food baskets, and water trucks.  CEDEC also 
introduced a statewide ranking of municipios affected by drought based on "techno-
scientific criteria."  The ranking was then used both to select different municipios to   10
receive emergency relief and to challenge local politicians' claims and attempts to 
"pressure" state officials to include their strongholds in the program (Lemos, et al. 2001).   
 
Water and Reservoir Management. In 1992, as part of Ceará’s modernizing government 
administration, and in response to a long period of drought, the state enacted Law 11.996 
that defined its policy for water resources management.  This new law created several 
levels of water management, including watershed Users’ Commissions, Watershed 
Committees and a state level Water Resources Council.  The law also defined the 
watershed as the planning unit of action; spelled out the instruments of allocation of 
water permits and fees for the use of water resources; and regulated further construction 
in the context of the watershed (Lemos and Oliveira 2004).   
One of the most innovative aspects of water reform in Ceará was the creation of 
an interdisciplinary group within the state water agency (COGERH) to think about how 
best implement all aspects of the reform.  The inclusion of social and physical scientists 
within the agency allowed for the combination of ideas and technologies that critically 
affected the way the network of técnicos and their supporters went about implementing 
water reform in the state. Right from the start  COGERH sought to engage stakeholders, 
taking advantage of previous political and social organization within the different basins 
to create new water organizations (Lemos and Oliveira 2005).  In the Lower Jaguaribe-
Banabuiú river basin, for example, the implementation of participatory councils went 
further than the suggested framework of River Basin Committees to include the Users 
Commission
14 to negotiate water allocation among different users directly. Técnicos 
specifically created the Commission independently of the “official” state structure to 
emphasize their autonomy vis-à-vis the state (Lemos and Oliveira 2005). This agenda 
openly challenged a pattern of exclusionary and clientelist water policymaking prevalent 
in Ceará and was a substantial departure from the topdown, insulated  fashion water 
allocation was negotiated in the past. The ability of these técnicos to implement the most 
innovative aspects of the Ceará reform can be explained partly by their insertion into 
policy networks that were instrumental in overcoming the opposition of more 
conservative sectors of the state apparatus and their supporters in the water user 
community (Lemos and Oliveira 2004). 
The role of knowledge in building adaptive capacity in the system was also 
important. As I have argued elsewhere: 
On the one hand, knowledge can contribute to more effective 
management by informing stakeholders about system capacity and 
fluctuations, potential disruptions to resource availability (e.g. drought or 
flooding), implications of intra- and inter-basin water transfers, long term 
availability, and intergeneration implications of different levels of 
resource use (i.e. climate change impact scenarios). It can also inform 
stakeholders about the implications of water quality for current use and 
future sustainability of water resources and support decisions regarding 
water zoning plans and pricing schemes. Moreover, the ability to transfer 
knowledge and adopt innovation is an essential factor in building adaptive 
capacity to climate variability and change (Smit, Burton et al. 2000). In 
this sense, knowledge can potentially improve effectiveness and   11
democratize decision-making since better-informed stakeholders can make 
better-informed decisions. On the other hand, if controlled by a few actors 
seeking to bolster their position vis-à-vis other stakeholders, knowledge 
can insulate decisions and exacerbate power imbalances between those 
with access to knowledge and those without that access (Lemos 2003). In 
such cases, knowledge can have critical implications for the “elite 
capture” of the decision-making processes, which in turn can affect issues 
of equity and justice in water management. Here, the difference between 
democratization and insulation rests on the rules of engagement of 
stakeholders and the practices regarding the availability (Lemos 
forthcoming). 
In the case of water management reform in Ceará, the organization of stakeholder 
councils and the effort to use technical knowledge to support their decisions may have 
enhanced the systems adaptive capacity to climate variability as well as improved water 
resources sustainability (Formiga-Johnsson and Kemper 2005; Engle 2007; Lemos 
forthcoming). For example, in a recent evaluation of the role of governance institutions in 
influencing adaptive capacity building in two basins in NE Brazil (Lower Jaguaribe in 
Ceará and Pirapama in Pernambuco), Engle (2007) found that water reform played a 
critical role in increasing adaptive capacity across the two basins. Indeed, participation 
can empower and legitimize the new water reform institutions, expand the array of 
stakeholders deliberating about water use and sustainability, improve accountability and 
strengthen the capacity of reform-oriented policy networks to push for further reform 
(Lemos and Oliveira 2004).  
In the context of Ceará’s Users Commissions, the advantages in this case are 
many. First, users are more likely to abide by the decisions at the river basin level (at this 
point there is not an established enforcement system, so basically, social pressure is the 
only weapon the técnicos and other users have to enforce how much water is being used) 
since they have been directly involved in the decision-making process. Second, by 
making simplified reservoir models available to users, COGERH is not only enhancing 
knowledge about the river basin but also is crystallizing the idea of collective risk. While 
individual users may be willing to “free-ride”, collective decision-making processes may 
be much more effective in curbing overuse. Third, information can play a critical role in 
the democratization of decision-making at the river basin level by training users to make 
decisions, and by dispelling the widespread distrust that has developed as a result of the 
traditional patterns of bureaucratic insulation. However, effective participation does not 
necessarily mean equitable participation. In fact, especially a the local level, there is 
growing evidence that despite progress in terms of increased participation, many 
stakeholders still perceive water management as an exclusionary process (Taddei 2005).  
These findings are consistent with data collected by a broad survey of Lower 
Jaguaribe River Basin Committee members carried out in 2004. Although they believe 
technical information is useful and helpful to their decision-making, they find it is neither 
widely available nor easily accessible and understandable. They also perceive power 
within the River Basin Committee as strongly skewed in favor of técnicos over other 
actors. For example, although 93.1 percent of the members report that technical 
information makes decision-making easier, only 32.1 percent perceive it as accessible 
and available to all members. Moreover, members surveyed pointed out that the main   12
constraint to the democratization of decision-making within the Committee is the 
disparate level of knowledge between técnicos and general members. This constraint is 
more important than economic and political power disparities. Indeed, such findings 
suggest that the persistence of technocratic insulation maybe one of the biggest hurdles to 
overcome in order to increase effective participation in river basin councils. They also 
show that despite the best intentions of reform-oriented técnicos, the dominance of 
technical expertise in water management in Brazil is a difficult pattern to break.  
 
A tale of three policies. This case study examines three policy areas in Ceará, NE Brazil 
and discusses their role in terms of adaptive capacity building for climate variability and 
change. In the introduction, I argued that any attempt to build adaptive capacity among 
poor segments of society vulnerable to climate-related phenomena must include both risk 
management and deeper structural reform to address the root causes of vulnerability to 
climate. While risk management attempts to prevent and plan specific adaptations to 
different climate impacts such as drought and flooding, structural reform encompasses 
addressing the many deficits (income, education, political power, safety, etc) that define 
vulnerability. And while risk management has been somewhat easier to come by, 
structural reform has remained unattainable to most poor countries in the world. 
However, because these are not discrete processes, action in one tier can affect and be 
affected by action in another in way that creates a positive synergy between them. Hence, 
it is important to identify which and how risk management institutions can contribute to 
not only to build resilience to specific climate-related hazard but also to decrease overall 
vulnerabilities among groups at risk.. From these three briefly examined case studies, it is 
possible to identify three factors through which risk management strategies can 
contribute to build overall system resilience beyond specific climate impacts. First by 
subscribing to principles of good governance in the design and implementation of risk 
management mechanisms, policy makers can contribute to build the resilience of 
decisionmaking systems overall. Thus while, Hora de Plantar topdown insulated 
policymaking process alienated clients and ultimately sealed the fate of the program as a 
failure, the creation of local level independent COMDECs to support disaster-relief 
meant a significant departure from previous clientelistic politics that perpetuated the 
vicious cycle of the drought industry. Second, policy networks and the reform oriented 
cadre that constitute them play a critical role in pushing for good governance and more 
participatory and accountable means of making and implementing policy. Third, 
knowledge can play a pivotal role in either insulating or democratizing decisionmaking. 
Whereas in Hora de Plantar, knowledge insulated decisionmaking from clients, in water 
management it may have contributed to better informed decisions. Yet, even in the 
context of participatory institutional reform, unequal availability and access to knowledge 
may skew decisionmaking and benefit some participants over others.  
  Despite some promising trends, these three examples are but a tiny portion of 
what is needed to decrease vulnerability to drought in Ceará. They are also limited to 
assessing adaptive capacity building to governance systems and do not assess general 
household vulnerability to drought in the state. Overall, Ceará remains one of the most 
poor and unequal states in Brazil and the hardship of drought still defines poverty, 
destitution and hopelessness among the poor rural population. Reforming governance is a   13
necessary but far from sufficient step to build resilience to drought for the most 
vulnerable. 
                                                           
1 And while irrigation could be an option to decrease this vulnerability, it might not be the best option since it currently 
consumes an estimated 60% of the state’s already overtaxed water resources (Lemos and Oliveira 2004).  
2 The 97 to 99, resulted in approximately 80 percent loss of crop yields in some parts of the Brazilian Northeast causing 
considerable social unrest. 
3 These policies ranged from the sublime–such as the distribution of food baskets among poor families affected by 
drought– to the bizarre as exemplified by the importation of fourteen camels from Northern Africa to work as farm 
animals in Ceará in the late XVIII century (Villa 2000). 
4 As early as 1910, Northeast Brazil had 124 rain gauges and four hydrometer stations installed. By the early 2000s the 
state of Ceará alone had over 7,000 reservoirs built, many on private property (Lemos forthcoming).  
 
5 For an in-depth discussion of these issues see Lemos (2003) and Nelson (2005). 
6 For the past fifteen years, the state government in Ceará has gone from an entrenched oligarchy of a few traditional 
political families to the most progressive state government in the Northeast.  The shift started in 1987 with the election 
of Tasso Jereissati as governor, his succession by Ciro Gomes in 1991, Jereissati return to power in 1994, and 
reelection in 1998. 
7 The project uses an innovative participatory mapping methodology developed by Nelson (2005). For more details, see 
www.projetomaplan.com. 
8 This program currently serves around 180,000 small farmers and 113 municipios (SDR 2007). 
9 For an official description of these programs, see http://www.seagri.ce.gov.br 
10 This section relies heavily on results from a NOAA funded project focusing on the use of climate information in NE 
Brazil. For more details see, Lemos et al. 2001.. 
11 Evaluation of soil humidity is vitally important to agriculture, particularly in the semi-arid farming regions.  In the 
state of Ceará, about 90 percent of the area is classified as semi-arid.  Water deficits occur frequently and constantly 
threatening subsistence agriculture production.  The small farmer depends on rainfed agriculture for his subsistence, 
and therefore experiences a high vulnerability to dry spells and climate change. 
12 Hora de Plantar distributes four kinds of seeds: corn, rice, and two kinds of beans–a fast growing type more suitable 
to short growing seasons– and a slower growing type with higher productivity and market value.  Beans, corn, and rice 
are the principal crops of small farmers in the Northeast. 
13 Personal communication, 2000. 
14 The Users Commission meets once a year (with smaller meetings happening in between) to negotiate bulk water 
allocation. A larger pool of stakeholders elects representatives from users, the state, and organized civil society to 
participate in the negotiated allocation process. Membership is broken down as follows: a) twenty-seven 
representatives from the municipal government (25%); b) eighteen representatives from the state and federal 
governments (17%); c) thirty-two representatives from civil society, and d) thirty representatives from the sectors of 
water users (28%). For a detailed study of these commissions see Taddei 2005.   14
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